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Pr(𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = Φ [𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ]   
𝛷
ɛ
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      
 𝛿  𝜏
ɛ
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Variable 
Mean for  
WOMAN BOARD =1 
(n= 473) 
Mean for  
WOMAN BOARD =0 
(n= 642) 
Difference t-stats 
BOARDSIZE 8.811 7.746 -1.07*** -9.21 
% INDEPENDENT 0.779 0.731 -5.06 -0.05 
CEO DUALITY 0.438 0.516 0.08*** 2.59 
INSIDERS 0.060 0.092 0.03*** 5.42 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.796 0.736 -0.06*** -4.61 
BMEETING 7.914 7.642 -0.27 -1.20 
CEO TENURE 7.372 9.303 1.93*** 5.07 
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 5,848,270 3,018,773 -2,829,497*** -8.87 
LEVERAGE 0.507 0.500 -0.01 -0.67 
VOLATILITY 4.935 5.354 0.42** 2.18 
LIQUIDITY 0.183 0.175 -0.01 -1.28 
FIRMAGE 17.590 13.490 -4.1*** -6.70 
QUALS WOMEN 2.116 2.309 0.19 1.39 
UNEMPLOYRATE 6.894 6.869 -0.02 -0.22 
NTBI TR 0.021 0.022 0 0.41 
TERMSTRUCTURE 2.004 1.879 -0.12** -2.02 
PRICE NAV 0.536 0.465 -0.07*** -5.28 
FFO/SHARE 2.385 2.454 0.07 0.44 
Table 2.3 shows the mean differences of firms with a woman on the board (WOMAN BOARD = 1) or not (WOMAN BOARD = 0). BOARDSIZE 
represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the 
company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS 
represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares 
held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO 
TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. 
LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is 
measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. QUALS WOMEN represents the average qualification level of female board members. 
UNEMPLOYRATE is the average unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. 
TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation 
divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
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BOARDSIZE 0.841* (1.79) 
% INDEPENDENT 2.38*** (3.01) 
CEO DUALITY 0.508*** (3.21) 
INSIDERS -0.196 (-0.23) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.850* (1.86) 
FIRMSIZE 0.367*** (3.63) 
LEVERAGE 0.158 (0.33) 
VOLATILITY -0.056 (-1.54) 
LIQUIDITY -1.112 (-1.23) 
PRICE NAV -0.118 (-0.31) 
QUALS WOMEN -0.058 (-0.78) 
INTERCEPT -8.114*** (-5.35) 
Observations 562 
Pseudo R² 0.16 
LR 69.58*** 
Table 2.4 provides the results of the first stage Heckman procedure (pooled probit regression) for the likelihood of a company 
having a woman on the board of directors. WOMAN BOARD is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one female director 
occupies a corporate board seat, 0 otherwise. BOARDSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the 
board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of 
outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all 
institutional investors. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and 
multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm 
of the market valuation divided by the NAV. QUALS WOMEN represents the average qualification level of female board 
members.***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. z-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
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  Executives Non-Executives 
  PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE 
% WOMEN EXE 0.185** (2.22) 1.001 (1.59)   
% WOMEN NONEXE   -0.074 (-0.73) -0.218 (-0.30) 
FIRMSIZE 0.068* (1.94) 0.999*** (4.94) 0.051 (1.37) 1.286*** (4.96) 
LEVERAGE -0.412*** (-4.12) 1.007* (1.76) -0.402*** (-3.57) 1.670** (2.02) 
VOLATILITY -0.011*** (-4.30) -0.097 (-1.29) -0.011*** (-4.19) -0.091 (-1.27) 
LIQUIDITY -0.290*** (-3.30) -2.001 (-1.53) -0.280*** (-2.66) -2.465* (-1.70) 
FIRMAGE -0.040 (-1.20) -0.309 (-1.23) -0.039 (-1.13) -0.282 (-1.13) 
FFO -0.033 (-1.49)  -0.023 (-1.07)  
PRICE/NAV  -0.339 (-0.45)  0.277 (0.40) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.005 (-0.17) -0.149 (-0.74) -0.010 (-0.22) 0.219 (1.24) 
CEO DUALITY 0.000 (-0.02) 0.106 (0.58) 0.007 (0.20) -0.283 (-0.84) 
INSIDERS 0.231* (1.94) 0.379 (0.40) 0.201 (1.32) -1.397 (-1.05) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.118** (1.97) -0.552 (-1.19) 0.115* (1.85) -0.617 (-1.24) 
BMEETING 0.019 (0.99) 0.026 (0.08) 0.018 (0.90) 0.024 (0.07) 
CEO TENURE 0.000 (0.04) 0.015 (0.92) 0.000 (0.10) 0.016 (0.95) 
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.009* (1.78) 0.210*** (4.47) 0.011 (1.61) 0.174*** (3.20) 
NTBI TR -0.073 (-0.58) 0.683 (0.45) -0.122 (-0.87) -0.195 (-0.12) 
TERMSTRUCTURE -0.016** (-2.37) -0.130*** (-2.68) -0.019** (-2.33) -0.116* (-1.88) 
MILLS -0.017 (-0.52) 0.066 (0.13) -0.018 (-0.20) 1.181 (1.61) 
INTERCEPT 0.144 (0.39) -12.125*** (-4.17) 0.274 (0.49) -17.562*** (-4.34) 
Observations 928 909 928 909 
R² 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.84 
Table 2.6 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed effects) for 
women in the group of executives and non-executives. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the 
NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. % WOMEN EXE and % WOMEN NON-EXE represents the percentage of women in the group of executives and 
non-executives, respectively. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 
40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, 
whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent 
directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 
0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). 
INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the 
number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. UNEMPLOYRATE is the average 
unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. TERMSTRUCTURE is 
the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account 
for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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  PRICE/NAV 
% WOMEN EXE -0.243** (-2.02) 
% WOMEN EXE SQ 0.885*** (4.09) 
FIRMSIZE 0.042 (1.53) 
LEVERAGE -0.277*** (-3.47) 
VOLATILITY -0.007*** (-2.70) 
LIQUIDITY -0.253*** (-2.82) 
FIRMAGE -0.040* (-1.96) 
FFO -0.032 (-1.44) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.000 (-0.02) 
CEO DUALITY -0.002 (-0.15) 
INSIDERS 0.189* (1.82) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.102** (2.16) 
BMEETING 0.008 (0.64) 
CEO TENURE 0.001 (0.47) 
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.067*** (3.75) 
NTBI TR -0.571*** (-4.30) 
TERMSTRUCTURE -0.064*** (-5.75) 
MILLS -0.054** (-1.99) 
INTERCEPT 0.205 (0.65) 
Observations 755 
R² 0.70 
Adj. R² 0.63 
Table 2.7 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects) for women in the group of executives and the squared percentage of women in the group of executives. PRICE/NAV 
is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. % WOMEN EXE and % WOMEN EXE SQ represents 
the percentage of women in the group of executives and the squared percentage of women, respectively. FIRMSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation 
of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the 
ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by 
the years since listing on the stock exchange. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's 
board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. 
INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS 
is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all 
board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. UNEMPLOYRATE is the average 
unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. 
TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated 
from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-
value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
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  Executives   
 PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE  
SKEWED -0.008(-0.31) 0.382(1.57)   
TILTED 0.013(0.46) 0.215(1.24)  
BALANCED 0.057*(1.73) 0.291(1.22)  
Observations 928 909   
Controls included included  
MILLS included included  
R² 0.76 0.77  
Adj. R² 0.72 0.73   
Table 2.8 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-
section fixed effects) with a focus on different gender compositions in the group of executives and non-
executives. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is 
the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. UNIFORM is a binary variable equal to 1 for homogeneous male groups, 0 otherwise and represents 
the reference category in all regressions. SKEWED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women 
varies from 1% to less than 15%, 0 otherwise. TILTED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women 
varies from 15% to less than 30%, 0 otherwise. BALANCED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of 
women is at least 30%, 0 otherwise. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account 
for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-
value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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No. of  
comment letters REITs        
Audit Analytics comment letters dataset (all file types) 
from 2004-2016   941  156        
Sample after matching with WRDS, CRPS, IBES, Ziman datasets  503  89          
10-K review sample after excluding all other filings 




85   
       
REITs classified by property type   
Diversified    47  9 
 
Retail    136  25 
 
Residential    53  10 
 
Office / Industrial   88  17 
 
Health    70  11 
 
Lodging / Resort    41  10 
 
Other    17  3 
 
Table 4.1 shows our sample selection process and classifies the number of comment letter reviews received by 
REITs into different property types. 
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  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. 
            
Panel A: Comment letter variables     
10KCL (%) 12.51 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 
NoComments 6.30 5.00 22.00 1.00 4.42 
Rounds 2.55 2.00 10.00 2.00 0.84 
RespTime 100.58 78.00 1,052.00 2.00 88.12 
      
Panel B:  Information asymmetry variable    
Spread (%) 0.13 0.07 3.72 0.01 0.23 
      
Panel C:  Control variables     
MarketCap ($ million) 4,582 2,157 68,157 34.91 6,762 
Volatility 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.02 
Turnover (%) 0.92 0.74 10.58 0.05 0.74 
Analyst 3.04 2.87 9.67 1.00 1.32 
Leverage (%) 56.09 57.22 121.39 2.43 16.65 
Table 4.2 reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for comment letter (Panel A), 
information asymmetry (Panel B) and control variables (Panel C). 10KCL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the firm-quarter observation is a 10-K comment letter public release event. NoComments is the sum of all 
comments in the first 10-K comment letter filed by the SEC. RespTime is the response time (days) from the 
receipt of the first comment letter by the REIT to the dissemination date of the whole conversation on the 
EDGAR website. Rounds is the number of 10-K comment letters within a correspondence from the SEC, that 
is, the number of rounds from the first letter to the "no further comment" 10-K letter. Spread is the quarterly 
percentage bid-ask spread, which is calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by 
the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices. MarketCap is the quarterly average of the equity value of the 
REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quarter. Turnover is the quarterly 
average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number 
of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by total assets. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
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𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡      

























2006 56 28 14 6 0 57 161 
2007 68 35 15 9 0 76 203 
2008 96 63 48 27 3 75 312 
2009 94 44 35 30 3 82 288 
2010 142 112 125 59 9 97 544 
2011 113 59 26 58 3 49 308 
2012 114 89 25 76 4 40 348 
2013 126 56 22 42 3 27 276 
2014 64 28 23 21 0 25 161 
2015 47 44 16 11 1 14 133 
2016 42 41 14 2 0 13 112 
Total 962 599 363 341 26 555 2,846 
Table 4.4 shows the number of comments in the six distinct comment letter categories as defined by Audit 
Analytics during our sample period. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.0024 (1.49) 0.0022 (1.35) 0.0045** (2.36) 0.0042** (2.21) 
10KCL -0.0001 (-1.31) -0.0001 (-1.01) -0.00005 (-0.46) -0.00002 (-0.18) 
10KCL_Lag1 -0.0001 (-1.38) -0.0001 (-0.97) -0.00002 (-0.22) 0.000002 (0.02) 
10KCL_Lag2 -0.0002*** (-3.18) -0.0003*** (-3.32) -0.0002** (-2.08) -0.0002** (-2.29) 
10KCL_Lag3 -0.0001 (-1.31) -0.0002 (-1.51) -0.0001 (-0.54) -0.0001 (-0.67) 
10KCL_Lag4 -0.0002* (-1.73) -0.0001 (-1.46) -0.0001 (-0.61) -0.00003 (-0.36) 
LogMarketCap -0.0005*** (-3.32) -0.0004*** (-3.24) -0.0007*** (-3.50) -0.0007*** (-3.43) 
Volatility 0.0523*** (6.25) 0.0532*** (6.36) 0.0481*** (5.64) 0.0488*** (5.74) 
LogTurnover -0.0003** (-2.28) -0.0004** (-2.45) -0.0003** (-2.13) -0.0004** (-2.25) 
Analyst -0.0002*** (-4.64) -0.0002*** (-4.87) -0.00004 (-0.96) -0.00005 (-1.09) 
Leverage 0.0006 (1.18) 0.0007 (1.23) -0.0004 (-0.86) -0.0004 (-0.79) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes Yes 
F-statistic 22.27 21.63 22.62 22.02 
R² 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 
Adj. R² 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions. Column 1 includes firm effects, column 2 firm and seasonal effects, 
column 3 firm and year effects and column 4 all three effects. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage bid-ask Spread 
(calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices). The 
independent variables of special interest are 10KCL (indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm-quarter observation is a 10-K comment 
letter public release event) as well as 10KCL_Lag1, 10KCL_Lag2, 10KCL_Lag3 and 10KCL_Lag4 (indicator variables for the 
subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the comment letter public release). We include the following controls: 
LogMarketCap is the logarithm of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns during the quarter. LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly 
average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by 
total assets. The sample consists of 3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
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 NoComments RespTime Rounds 
Intercept 0.0046** (2.32) 0.0046** (2.32) 0.0046** (2.33) 
Complex_NoComments -0.000001 (-0.01)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag1 -0.00004 (-0.35)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag2 -0.0002** (-2.52)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag3 0.0001 (0.35)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag4 0.00003 (0.22)   
Complex_RespTime  0.00003 (0.15)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag1  -0.0001 (-0.86)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag2  -0.0002*** (-2.73)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag3  -0.0001 (-0.33)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag4  0.0001 (0.48)  
Complex_Rounds   -0.0002** (-1.99) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag1   -0.0001 (-1.10) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag2   -0.0002** (-2.03) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag3   0.0001 (0.29) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag4   0.0001 (0.85) 
LogMarketCap -0.0007*** (-3.49) -0.0007*** (-3.5) -0.0007*** (-3.49) 
Volatility 0.0483*** (5.64) 0.0482*** (5.63) 0.0481*** (5.69) 
LogTurnover -0.0003** (-2.17) -0.0003** (-2.20) -0.0003** (-2.2) 
Analyst -0.0001 (-1.24) -0.0001 (-1.23) -0.0001 (-1.28) 
Leverage -0.0005 (-0.94) -0.0005 (-0.94) -0.0005 (-0.92) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 21.62 21.63 21.65 
R² 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Adj. R² 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions for complex comment letters. The dependent variable is the quarterly 
percentage bid-ask Spread (calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the closing bid 
and ask prices). The independent variables of special interest are in column 1 Complex_NoComments (comment letters with an above 
median number of comments, Median = 5 comments) as well as Complex_NoComments_Lag1, Complex_NoComments_Lag2, 
Complex_NoComments_Lag3, Complex_NoComments_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters 
following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the number of comments). In Column 2 Complex_RespTime 
(comment letters with an above median number of response time, Median = 78 days) as well as Complex_RespTime_Lag1, 
Complex_RespTime_Lag2, Complex_RespTime_Lag3, Complex_RespTime_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three 
and four quarters following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the response time). In Column 3 Complex_Rounds 
(comment letters with an above median number of rounds, Median = 2 rounds) as well as Complex_Rounds_Lag1, 
Complex_Rounds_Lag2, Complex_Rounds_Lag3, Complex_Rounds_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and 
four quarters following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the number of rounds). We include the following 
controls: LogMarketCap is the logarithm of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns during the quarter. LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the 
quarterly average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt 
divided by total assets. The sample consists of 3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
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 Account MD&A NonGAAP 
Intercept 0.0042** (2.21) 0.0042** (2.20) 0.0042** (2.21) 
Account -0.000004 (-0.04)   
Account_Lag1 -0.00002 (-0.21)   
Account_Lag2 -0.0002** (-2.34)   
Account_Lag3 -0.00003 (-0.27)   
Account_Lag4 -0.00001 (-0.06)   
MD&A  0.00002 (0.10)  
MD&A_Lag1  0.0001 (0.73)  
MD&A_Lag2  -0.0002** (-2.30)  
MD&A_Lag3  -0.0001** (-2.10)  
MD&A_Lag4  -0.00004 (-0.37)  
NonGAAP   -0.0001 (-1.36)  
NonGAAP_Lag1   0.0001 (0.75) 
NonGAAP_Lag2   -0.00004 (-0.44) 
NonGAAP_Lag3   -0.0002* (-1.93) 
NonGAAP_Lag4   0.0001 (0.55) 
LogMarketCap -0.0007*** (-3.43) -0.0007*** (-3.44) -0.0007*** (-3.45) 
Volatility 0.0487*** (5.72) 0.0488*** (5.72) 0.0488*** (5.76) 
LogTurnover -0.0004** (-2.24) -0.0004** (-2.23) -0.0004** (-2.27) 
Analyst -0.00005 (-1.07) -0.00005 (-1.07) -0.00005 (-1.09) 
Leverage -0.0004 (-0.79) -0.0004 (-0.78) -0.0004 (-0.83) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 22.02 22.03 22.01 
R² 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Adj. R² 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the fixed-effects regressions for the comment letter content variables. The dependent variable is the 
quarterly percentage bid-ask Spread (calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the 
closing bid and ask prices). The independent variables of special interest are in column 1 Account (indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
SEC’s first 10-K comment letter contains comments in the accounting category) as well as Account_Lag1, Account_Lag2, 
Account_Lag3, Account_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the accounting 
category comment letter public release). In Column 2 MD&A (indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC’s first 10-K comment letter 
contains comments in the MD&A category) as well as MD&A_Lag1, MD&A_Lag2, MD&A_Lag3, MD&A_Lag4 (indicator variables 
for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the MD&A category comment letter public release). In Column 3 
NonGAAP (indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC’s first 10-K comment letter contains comments on non-GAAP measures) as well as 
NonGAAP_Lag1, NonGAAP_Lag2, NonGAAP_Lag3, NonGAAP_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four 
quarters following the non-GAAP comment letter public release). We include the following controls: LogMarketCap is the logarithm 
of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quarter. 
LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly average of market capitalization. 
Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by total assets. The sample consists of 
3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 
and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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